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Banking malware in Google Play targeting many new apps

01 April 2017


While casually browsing my daily notifications on Koodous I found banking malware on Google Play, which has many new banking app targets in its configuration. A new sample was flagged by one of my BankBot rules: Funny Videos 2017. It struck me as different than the usual BankBot samples since it was tagged as using DexProtector, a tool to heavily obfuscate APKs. In addition the app name wasn’t the usual popular name (i.e. Flash Player, HD Coded or Google Play Update), so I figured I’d check it out a bit more.

Looking at the names of the activities and other manifest items it seemed like a normal app with inserted malware. I had read about another sample of the malware recently that was inserted into an existing app and uploaded to Google Play, so I figured I would check Google Play just to be sure. Still to my surprise it was actually there in Google Play.


Figure 1: Funny Videos 2017 app in Google Play (update: no longer available)

Apparently the app was updated recently (April 8, 2017) and this was most likely when the malware was added. I reported the app through their reporting system but at the time of writing it is still available in Google Play. As you can see it does appear to have 1k to 5k installs, which isn’t much for a normal app, but quite a lot for malware (at least compared to the installation counts we’ve seen so far on other mobile banking malware).


Figure 2: additional Google Play app info


It is known that this technique has been used before, but is there anything interesting about this sample besides that it is available in Google Play? One of my co-workers was eager to look into it so he decided to run it on a device and captured some traffic:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: nginx Date: Wed, 12 Apr 2017 20:01:45 GMT Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Connection: close X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16 Content-Length: 40513

<tag>yy kkk kmy or kme yg kko yg kkm kkr kmt or yy kmk kkl kkt kkg yh kmk kkt kmt eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or kme yg kko yg kkm kkr kmt or yy kmk kkl yh yg kkm kmg eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or kkl kkk kll kmt kkr kko kkk kkm or kmt kkt yy kmk kkl eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or kkt kkk kml kkr kkr kmk yy kmo or kmt kkt yh yg kkm kmg yg kkt kmt eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or kkr kmk yh eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or yg kmg yh yg kkm kmg or yg kkm kmm kko kkk kmt kmm or yg kkl kkl kkt or yg kmg yh yg kkm kmg yt kmm kmt kko kmk kmg kkr eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or yg kmg yh yg kkm kmg or kkt kkk kml kkr kkk kkr kkl eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or yg kmg yh yg kkm kmg or yg kkm kmm kko kkk kmt kmm or yg kkl kkl kkt or yg kmg yh yg kkm kmg yt kmm kmt kko kmk kmg kkr yt kkr yg yh kmh kmk kkr eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or klk kmg yh or yg kkm kmm kko kkk kmt kmm kkr yg yh kmh [removed for brevity] kkk kko kme or kmy kmt yy kko kkk kmk kmy kkg or yg kkm kmm kko kkk kmt kmm or kmy kkk kmm kmk kmh or yy kkk kmy kmy kkk kkm or hr ho ht kkt kmk kko rt kkl kkl kmh kmt yy yg kkr kmt kkk kkm gr ge gh g eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or kme kkk kkk kme kmh kmk or yg kkm kmm kko kkk kmt kmm or oy kme kmy oy eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or kkl yg klk kkl yg kmh or yg kkm kmm kko kkk kmt kmm or kkl tm kkl kmy kkk yh kmt kmh kmk eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or kkl yg klk kkl yg kmh or kmo kmk kko kmk eg tm gm kkm kmk kkr or yg kkr kkk kkt or yg kmh kko yg kmr kmo kmt or kmy kkk yh kmt kmh kmk kmg kky eg tm gm kmk kkt or kmh yg yy yg kmt klm yg or kmo yy kmk kmt yy kkk kkm tm eg tm gm yy kkk kmy or klk kmg yh or yg kkm kmm kko kkk kmt kmm eg tm gm 1yy kkk kmy or yg kkm kmm kko kkk kmt kmm or kkh kmk kkm kmm kmt kkm kme1 eg tm gm </tag>

Looking at the data that came from the server I immediately noticed the ‘<tag>[obfuscated data]</tag>’ format that I had run into earlier so I started searching for the code to deobfuscate it. Since the DexProtector obfuscated APK takes some time to deobfuscate and most malware doesn’t update very quickly I decided to get a recent BankBot sample that wasn’t obfuscated this heavily to obtain the deobfuscation routine. I ended up using sample 7c2e913571dad579fc8fa3a03171cf523e86a0686e1ba14f277da33569410646 for this purpose since it’s very recent (March 28, 2017) and also had the ‘/private/inj_lst.php’ request URL inside it. I cleaned up the deobfuscation routine from the sample a bit and ended up with the following code:


public class Deobfuscator {

   public static String deobfuscate(String obfuscatedText) {       int j = 0;       String result = “”;       String key = “mkleotrghyua”;       int i = 0;       try {          while(i < key.length()) {             obfuscatedText = obfuscatedText.replace(key.substring(i, i + 1), “” + i);             ++i;          }

         String[] strArr = obfuscatedText.split(“ “);          while(j < strArr.length) {             result = result + (((char)Integer.parseInt(strArr[j])));             ++j;          }       }       catch(Exception e) {       }       return URLDecoder.decode(result + “ “);    }

   public static void main(String[] args) {       String obfuscated = “”;       System.out.println(Deobfuscator.deobfuscate(obfuscated));    } }

The key in the sample used for comparison ended up being the same as used in the Google Play sample, so I was lucky enough not to have to spend any additional time figuring that out. Throwing the obtained server data into the Java code and running the program resulting in the deobfuscated data containing a list of all apps that are targeted.

To our surprise the list was more extensive than expected and for the first time contained some new Dutch targets including ABN, Rabobank, ASN, Regiobank, and Binck. The full list can be found below. After seeing one of our customers on the target list we decided to update our detection signatures so we can now also detect this sample in our effort to prevent online banking fraud. I guess the game has started once again after some nice and quiet period. So far I have no reason to believe the functionality of the malware is significantly different from the previous samples, but I’ll have a closer look at it.


Google has decided to take the app out of the Play Store. As it turns out, the malware is mostly phishing for credit card details and internet banking credentials. Screenshots of some of the phishing overlays can be seen in the image below.


Figure 3: collection of overlays

Targeted apps ar.bapro ar.bapro.tablet ar.macro at.bawag.mbanking at.bawag.tablet at.easybank.mbanking at.oberbank.mbanking at.spardat.netbanking at.volksbank.volksbankmobile ch.raiffeisen.phototan com.AlinmaSoftToken com.BOQSecure com.BankAlBilad com.CredemMobile com.EurobankEFG com.IngDirectAndroid com.QIIB com.SifrebazCep com.VBSmartPhoneApp com.abnamro.grip com.adib.mbs com.akbank.softotp com.alinma.smartphone com.alpha.pass com.amanalrajhi com.appfactory.tmb com.arabbank.arabimobile com.axis.cbk com.bancamarch.bancamovil com.bancomer.mbanking com.bancsabadell.wallet com.bankia.wallet com.bankinter.launcher com.bankinter.portugal.bmb com.bankofireland.mobilebanking com.bankofqueensland.boq com.bankofqueensland.boqtablet com.bawagpsk.securityapp com.binckbank.evolution com.bnpp.easybanking com.boi.tablet365 com.bsffm com.business_token com.cajamar.GCCajamar com.cbq.CBMobile com.cic_prod.bad com.cic_prod_tablet.bad com.cleverlance.csas.servis24 com.cm_prod.bad com.cm_prod_tablet.bad com.comdirect.phototan com.commerzbank.kontostand com.commerzbank.photoTAN com.cs.vasco com.csg.cs.dnmb com.db.mobilebanking com.db.pbc.miabanca com.db.pbc.mibanco com.db.pbc.phototan.db com.db.tabbanking com.defencebank.locationapp com.ducont.meethaq com.ducont.muscatbank com.entersekt.authapp.dkb com.ezmcom.softtoken.adcb com.firstdirect.bankingonthego com.fpe.comptenickel com.fusion.banking com.fusion.beyondbank com.garanti.bonusapp com.garanti.cepbank com.garanti.cepsubesi com.getingroup.mobilebanking com.greater.Greater com.htsu.hsbcpersonalbanking com.icomvision.bsc.mobilebank com.imb.banking2 com.ingbanktr.cuzdan com.ingbanktr.ingmobil com.intertech.mobilemoneytransfer.activity com.isis_papyrus.raiffeisen_pay_eyewdg com.kbc.mobilebanking com.kutxabank.appatxas com.kuveytturk.mobil com.latuabanca_tabperandroid com.latuabancaperandroid com.latuabancaperandroid.ispb com.lcl.application.tablette com.lloydsbank.businessmobile com.magiclick.odeabank com.mbanking.nbb com.mediaengine.allianzbank com.mobileloft.alpha.droid com.mobilenik.bsf com.mobilenik.ubika.bna com.mosync.app_Banco_Galicia com.nbo.mobs com.ncb.softtoken com.nearform.ptsb com.niobiumlabs.eurobank.activity com.posteitaliane.postemobilestore com.pozitron.anb com.pozitron.ingkurumsal com.pozitron.iscep com.pozitron.vakifbank com.rak com.rev.mobilebanking.westpac com.rsi com.rsi.ruralviatablet com.s4m com.sabb com.samba.mb com.scrignosa com.sella.BancaSella com.softtech.isbankasi com.solidpass.main.bsf com.supervielle.mBanking com.targo_prod.bad com.targo_prod_tablet.bad com.teb com.tecnocom.cajalaboral com.tmob.denizbank com.tmobtech.halkbank com.unicajaTabletas com.unicredit com.vipera.ts.starter.FGB com.vipera.ts.starter.MashreqAE com.vipera.ts.starter.MashreqQA com.vipera.ts.starter.QNB com.ykb.androidtablet com.ykb.avm com.ziraat.ziraatmobil coop.bancocredicoop.bancamobile cz.csas.business24 cz.csob.smartbanking cz.csob.smartklic cz.mbank cz.moneta.smartbanka cz.sberbankcz cz.ulikeit.fio de.comdirect de.commerzbanking.mobil de.consorsbank de.dkb.portalapp de.dzbank.kartenregie de.ing_diba.kontostand de.postbank.finanzassistent enbd.mobilebanking enbd.mobilebanking.ksamobile enbd.mobilebanking.smartbusiness es.bancopopular.nbmpopular es.bancopopular.nbmpopulartablet es.bancosantander.apps es.bancosantander.empresas es.bancosantander.wallet es.bmn.bmnapp2 es.bmn.cajagranadaapp2 es.bmn.cajamurciaapp2 es.bmn.sanostraapp2 es.caixagalicia.activamovil es.caixageral.caixageralapp es.ccm.ccmapp es.evobanco.bancamovil es.liberbank.cajasturapp es.univia.unicajamovil eu.eleader.mobilebanking.abk eu.eleader.mobilebanking.bre eu.eleader.mobilebanking.nbk eu.eleader.mobilebanking.pekao eu.eleader.mobilebanking.pekao.firm eu.eleader.mobilebanking.raiffeisen eu.inmite.prj.kb.mobilbank finansbank.enpara fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplus fr.banquepopulaire.cyberplustablet fr.creditagricole.androidapp fr.creditagricole.macarteca it.bcc.iccrea.mycartabcc it.bpm.bpmandroid it.bpm.ptbandroid it.carige it.cividale.bpconline it.creval.bancaperta it.elfisystems.ncbc.droid.tablet it.nogood.container it.popso.SCRIGNOapp it.relaxbanking it.ubi.digitalcode it.ubiss.mpay mbanking.NBG mobile.alphabank.myAlphaWallet_android net.atos.alrajhi.mobilekw nl.asnbank.asnbankieren nl.rabomobiel nl.regiobank.regiobankieren nl.snsbank.snsbankieren nl.snsbank.snshelp org.banelco org.banelco.ibay org.banelco.qlms org.banelco.rbts org.banelco.sdmr org.banking.bsa.businessconnect org.banking.stg.businessconnect org.westpac.col pl.aliorbank.kantorwalutowy pl.bzwbk.bzwbk24 pl.bzwbk.ibiznes24 pl.eurobank pl.mbank pl.millennium.corpApp pl.pkobp.iko posteitaliane.posteapp.appbpol pt.bes.bestablet pt.cgd.caixadirecta pt.cgd.caixadirectaempresas pt.novobanco.nbapp pt.santandertotta.mobileparticulares rm.beleggen tsb.mobilebanking www.ingdirect.nativeframe

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